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Abstract
Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental properties
of a system cannot change without the change of its physical proper-
ties. In this paper, I argue that the Everett interpretation of quantum
mechanics or Everett’s theory seems to violate the principle of psy-
chophysical supervenience. In order to be consistent with our experi-
ence, the theory assumes psychophysical supervenience in each world,
including our world. However, this permits the possibility that under
certain unitary time evolution which does not lead to world branch-
ing, the wave function of each world changes and correspondingly the
mental states of the observers in the world also change, while the wave
function of the total worlds does not change, which violates the prin-
ciple of psychophysical supervenience for all worlds. It seems that one
must go beyond Everett’s theory such as denying multiplicity in order
to avoid the failure of psychophysical supervenience.
Psychophysical supervenience is an important principle in the philosophy
of mind. The standard definition of supervenience is that a set of properties
A supervenes on another set B in case no two things can differ with respect
to A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties
(see McLaughlin and Bennett, 2014). By this definition, psychophysical
supervenience requires that the mental properties of a system cannot change
without the change of its physical properties. In particular, for a system
with many observers, the principle requires that the mental properties of
each observer cannot change without the change of the physical properties
of the system. In this paper, I will argue that the Everett interpretation
of quantum mechanics or Everett’s theory seems to violate the principle of
psychophysical supervenience.
Everett’s theory assumes that the wave function of a physical system is
a complete description of the system, and the wave function always evolves
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in accord with the linear Schro¨dinger equation. In order to solve the mea-
surement problem, the theory further assumes that after a measurement
with many possible results there appear many equally real worlds, in each
of which there is an observer who is consciously aware of a definite result
(Everett, 1957; DeWitt and Graham, 1973; Wallace, 2012). In the following,
I will analyze whether Everett’s theory is consistent with the principle of
psychophysical supervenience.
Consider a simple measurement situation, in which an observer M mea-
sures a certain property of the measured system S, whose eigenvalues include
0 and 1. When the state of S is |0〉S1, the state of M does not change after
the measurement:
|0〉S |0〉M → |0〉S |0〉M . (1)
When the state of S is |1〉S , the state of M changes and she obtains a result:
|1〉S |0〉M → |1〉S |1〉M . (2)
The measurement can be represented by a unitary time evolution operator,
U . Then the above two measurements can be formulated as follows:
U |0〉S |0〉M = |0〉S |0〉M . (3)
U |1〉S |0〉M = |1〉S |1〉M . (4)
According to Everett’s theory, there is no world branching, and there is
still one observer, namely the original observer, after these measurements.
For example, after the second measurement, the physical state of the ob-
server changes from |0〉M to |1〉M , and correspondingly her mental state
changes from the ready state to a result state; she obtains the result 1.
Moreover, the observer is also consciously aware of the change of her mental
state. Obviously, the principle of psychophysical supervenience is satisfied
in these processes.
Now suppose the observer M measures the system S being in a super-
posed state, |0〉S + |1〉S . For simplicity I omit the nomalization factor 1/
√
2.
By the linear Schro¨dinger equation, the physical state of the composite sys-
tem after the measurement will evolve into the following superposition:
|0〉S |0〉M + |1〉S |1〉M . (5)
That is:
U(|0〉S + |1〉S) |0〉M = |0〉S |0〉M + |1〉S |1〉M . (6)
1I will use the elegant Dirac notation throughout this paper.
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According to Everett’s theory, there is world branching after this measure-
ment, and the post-measurement state corresponds to two worlds, in each
of which there is an observer who obtains a definite result, either 0 or 1.2
There are in general three ways of understanding the notion of multi-
plicity in Everett’s theory: (1) measurements lead to multiple worlds at
the fundamental level (DeWitt and Graham, 1973), (2) measurements lead
to multiple worlds only at the non-fundamental “emergent” level (Wallace,
2012), and (3) measurements only lead to multiple minds (Zeh, 1981).3 In
either case, for the above post-measurement state (6), the mental state of
each observer is not determined uniquely by the whole wave function, but
determined only by the corresponding branch of the wave function.4 This
means that the principle of psychophysical supervenience is satisfied in each
world. The question is: is the principle of psychophysical supervenience
satisfied in the whole worlds?
In order to answer this question, let’s analyze possible evolution of the
above post-measurement state or the corresponding worlds. First, consider a
unitary time evolution operator, UA, which does not lead to world branching
and changes |0〉S |0〉M to |1〉S |1〉M and |1〉S |1〉M to |A1〉S |A1〉M :
UA |0〉S |0〉M = |1〉S |1〉M , (7)
UA |1〉S |1〉M = |A1〉S |A1〉M , (8)
where A1 is an eigenvalue of the measured property of S. The principle of
psychophysical supervenience is satisfied for the evolution. In particular,
the first evolution of the observer is exactly the same as the evolution of
the observer in (4); the physical state of the observer changes from |0〉M to
|1〉M , and correspondingly her mental state changes from the ready state
to a result state. Moreover, the observer is also consciously aware of the
change of her mental state.
Then the unitary time evolution of the above post-measurement state is
UA(|0〉S |0〉M + |1〉S |1〉M ) = |1〉S |1〉M + |A1〉S |A1〉M . (9)
2Note that in Wallace’s (2012) formulation of Everett’s theory the number of the emer-
gent observers after the measurement is not definite due to the imperfectness of decoher-
ence. My following analysis also applies to this formulation.
3It is worth noting that Albert and Loewer’s (1988) many-minds theory does not assume
the usual notion of multiplicity as listed above. It assumes the existence of infinitely
many minds even for a post-measurement product state, and it already entails dualism
and violates the principle of psychophysical supervenience. I will not discuss this theory
in this paper.
4If the mental state of each observer is not determined by the corresponding branch
of the post-measurement superposition, then the predictions of the theory will be not
consistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics and experience for some unitary
time evolution of the superposition.
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By the linearity of the dynamics, the evolution of the two worlds are the
same as the above two forms of evolution, and the principle of psychophysical
supervenience is satisfied in each world. For example, when the physical
state of the observer in the first world changes from |0〉M to |1〉M , her
mental state changes from the ready state to a result state. Moreover, she
is consciously aware of the change of her mental state.
Now consider one of these unitary time evolution operators, UN , for
which A1 = 0. In other words, UN changes |0〉S |0〉M to |1〉S |1〉M and
|1〉S |1〉M to |0〉S |0〉M . It is similar to the NOT gate for a single q-bit, and is
permitted by the Schro¨dinger equation in principle. Then the unitary time
evolution of the above post-measurement state is
UN (|0〉S |0〉M + |1〉S |1〉M ) = |1〉S |1〉M + |0〉S |0〉M . (10)
Again, there is no world branching, and the principle of psychophysical
supervenience is satisfied in each world. When the physical state of the ob-
server in the first world changes from |0〉M to |1〉M , her mental state changes
from the ready state to a result state; she obtains the result 1. Moreover,
she is consciously aware of the change of her mental state. Similarly, when
the physical state of the observer in the second world changes from |1〉M to
|0〉M , her mental state also changes from the result state to the ready state
correspondingly; she “loses” the result 1 (and relevant memory). On the
other hand, after the unitary time evolution the whole superposition does
not change.
Therefore, Everett’s theory predicts that after the above unitary time
evolution, the physical state of the composite system, which is completely
represented by the wave function of the system, does not change, while the
mental states of the two involved observers both change after the evolution.
This means that the principle of psychophysical supervenience, which re-
quires that the mental properties of a system cannot change without the
change of its physical properties, is violated for the evolution of the whole
worlds.
There are two possible ways to avoid the violation of psychophysical su-
pervenience. The first way is to deny that after the evolution the physical
state of the composite system has not changed. This requires that the wave
function of a system is not a complete description of the physical state of
the system, and additional variables are needed to introduce to describe
the complete physical state. However, this requirement is not consistent
with Everett’s theory. Moreover, it is worth noting that in order to save
psychophysical supervenience, it is also required that the additional vari-
ables should be changed by the unitary time evolution of the wave function,
and the mental state of an observer should also supervene on the addi-
tional variables; otherwise the introduction of these variables cannot save
psychophysical supervenience in the above example.
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The second way to avoid the violation of psychophysical supervenience
in the above example is to deny that after the evolution the total mental
properties of the composite system have changed. However, this is inconsis-
tent with the requirement of Everett’s theory that the mental state of the
observer in each world is determined by the corresponding branch of the
post-measurement superposition. As noted before, this requirement is ne-
cessiated by the linearity of the dynamics and the consistency of the theory
with our experience in our world. By this requirement, when the physical
state of the observer in a world changes from |0〉M to |1〉M , her mental state
also changes from the ready state to the corresponding result state. More-
over, the observer is consciously aware of the change of her mental state.
Since the mental state of the observer in each world changes, the mental
properties of the composite system also change.
In order to see this point more clearly, one can compare the above unitary
time evolution operator UN and the identity operator I:
I(|0〉S |0〉M + |1〉S |1〉M ) = |0〉S |0〉M + |1〉S |1〉M . (11)
Under the identity time evolution I, the mental state of the observer in each
world does not change. While under the unitary time evolution UN , the
mental state of the observer in each world changes, such as from the ready
state to a result state, and the observer is also consciously aware of the
change of her mental state; she obtains a result. On the other hand, if there
are no many worlds and only one world, then after the above evolution UN
the total mental properties of the composite system do not change either,
since after the evolution there remain an observer with the same mental
content, which contains a result 0 (ready state) and a result 1. This is the
situation in collapse theories (see Gao, 2017).
Finally, it may be worth noting that since there is no world branching
during the above evolution, there is no additional complexity about the
definition of the identity of observers, and the analysis of personal identity
is the same as that in the classical world (see, e.g. Olson, 2017). If one
denies that the observer in each of the two worlds keeps her identity after the
above evolution, then one need to either deny the linearity of the dynamics
or deny the observer keeps her identity even when she makes a measurement
in a single world (see (4) or (7)). In fact, no matter how to define personal
identity, if only the mental state of an observer changes from the ready state
to a result state, the observer can be consciously aware of the change of the
mental state. While if the mental state of an observer does not change,
the observer can certainly not be consciously aware of the change. This
difference is the main basis of the above analysis.
To sum up, I have argued that Everett’s theory seems to violate the
principle of psychophysical supervenience. In order to be consistent with
our experience, the theory assumes psychophysical supervenience in each
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world, including our world. For example, minds are emergent in each world
according to Wallace’s (2012) formulation. This permits the possibility that
under certain unitary time evolution each world branch changes and cor-
respondingly the mental states of the observers in the world also changes,
while the wave function of the total worlds does not change. This possi-
bility leads to the violation of psychophysical supervenience for all worlds,
since the wave function of a system is a complete description of the physical
state of the system in Everett’s theory. It seems that one must go beyond
Everett’s theory such as denying multiplicity in order to avoid the failure of
psychophysical supervenience.
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